Philippines: An Initial Statement
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial killings
By Professor Philip Alston
Special Rapporteur of the United
Nations Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions
Manila, 21 February
2007
I have spent the past
ten days in the
Philippines at
the invitation of the Government in order to inquire into the
phenomenon of extrajudicial executions. I am very grateful to the
Government for the unqualified cooperation extended to me. During my
stay here I have met with virtually all of the relevant senior
officials of Government. They include the President, the Executive
Secretary, the National Security Adviser, the Secretaries for Defence,
Justice, DILG and the Peace Process. I have also met with a
significant number of members of Congress on different sides of the
political spectrum, the Chief Justice, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Chair of the Human Rights
Commission, the Ombudsman, the members of both sides of the Joint
Monitoring Committee, and representatives of the MNLF and MILF. Of
particular relevance to my specific concerns, I also met with Task
Force Usig, and with the Melo Commission, and I have received the
complete dossier compiled by TF Usig, as well as the report of the
Melo Commission, the and the responses to its findings by the AFP and
by retired Maj-Gen Palparan. I have also visited Baguio and Davao and
met with the regional Human Rights Commission offices, local PNP and
AFP commanders, and the Mayor of Davao, among others.
Equally importantly,
roughly half of my time here was devoted to meetings with
representatives of civil society, in Manila, Baguio, and Davao.
Through their extremely valuable contributions in the form of
documentation and detailed testimony I have learned a great deal.
Let me begin by
acknowledging several important elements. The first is that the
Government's invitation to visit reflects a clear recognition of the
gravity of the problem, a willingness to permit outside scrutiny, and
a very welcome preparedness to engage on this issue. The assurances
that I received from the President, in particular, were very
encouraging. Second, I note that my visit takes place within the
context of a counter-insurgency operation which takes place on a range
of fronts, and I do not in any way underestimate the resulting
challenges facing for the Government and the AFP. Third, I wish to
clarify that my formal role is to report to the UN Human Rights
Council and to the Government on the situation I have found. I
consider that the very fact of my visit has already begun the process
of acting as a catalyst to deeper reflection on these issues both
within the national and international settings. Finally, I must
emphasize that the present statement is only designed to give a
general indication of some, but by no means all, of the issues to be
addressed, and the recommendations put forward, in my final report. I
expect that will be available sometime within the next three months.
Sources of information
The first major
challenge for my mission was to obtain detailed and well supported
information. I have been surprised by both the amount and the quality
of information provided to me. Most key Government agencies are
organized and systematic in much of their data collection and
classification. Similarly, Philippines civil society organizations
are generally sophisticated and professional. I sought, and obtained,
meetings across the entire political spectrum. I leave the Philippines
with a wealth of information to be processed in the preparation of my
final report.
But the question has
still been posed as to whether the information provided to me by
either all, or at least certain, local NGO groups can be considered
reliable. The word 'propaganda' was used by many of my interlocutors.
What I took them to mean was that the overriding goal of the relevant
groups in raising EJE questions was to gain political advantage in the
context of a broader battle for public opinion and power, and that the
HR dimensions were secondary at best. Some went further to suggest
that many of the cases were fabricated, or at least trumped up, to
look more serious than they are.
I consider it
essential to respond to these concerns immediately. First, there is
inevitably a propaganda element in such allegations. The aim is to win
public sympathy and to discredit other actors. But the existence of a
propaganda dimension does not, in itself, destroy the credibility of
the information and allegations. I would insist, instead, on the need
to apply several tests relating to credibility. First, is it only NGOs
from one part of the political spectrum who are making these
allegations? The answer is clearly 'no'. Human rights groups in the
Philippines range across the entire spectrum in terms of their
political sympathies, but I met no groups who challenged the basic
fact that large numbers of extrajudicial executions are taking place,
even if they disagreed on precise figures. Second, how compelling is
the actual information presented? I found there was considerable
variation ranging from submissions which were entirely credible and
contextually aware all the way down to some which struck me as
superficial and dubious. But the great majority are closer to the top
of that spectrum than to the bottom. Third, has the information proved
credible under 'cross-examination'. My colleagues and I heard a large
number of cases in depth and we probed the stories presented to us in
order to ascertain their accuracy and the broader context.
As a result, I believe
that I have gathered a huge amount of data and certainly much more
than has been made available to any one of the major national
inquiries.
Extent of my focus
My focus goes well
beyond that adopted by either TF Usig or the Melo Commission, both of
which are concerned essentially with political and media killings.
Those specific killings are, in many ways, a symptom of a much more
extensive problem and we should not permit our focus to be limited
artificially. The TF Usig/Melo scope of inquiry is inappropriate for
me for several reasons:
(a) The approach is
essentially reactive. It is not based on an original assessment of
what is going on in the country at large, but rather on what a
limited range of CSOs report. As a result, the focus then is often
shifted (unhelpfully) to the orientation of the CSO, the quality of
the documentation in particular cases, etc.;
(b) Many killings are
not reported, or not pursued, and for good reason; and
(c) A significant
proportion of acknowledged cases of 'disappearances' involve
individuals who have been killed but who are not reflected in the
figures.
How many have been killed?
The numbers game is
especially unproductive, although a source of endless fascination. Is
it 25, 100, or 800? I don't have a figure. But I am certain that the
number is high enough to be distressing. Even more importantly,
numbers are not what count. The impact of even a limited number of
killings of the type alleged is corrosive in many ways. It intimidates
vast numbers of civil society actors, it sends a message of
vulnerability to all but the most well connected, and it severely
undermines the political discourse which is central to a resolution of
the problems confronting this country.
Permit me to make a
brief comment on the term 'unexplained killings', which is used by
officials and which I consider to be inapt and misleading. It may be
appropriate in the context of a judicial process but human rights
inquiries are more broad-ranging and one does not have to wait for a
court to secure a conviction before one can conclude that human rights
violations are occurring. The term 'extrajudicial killings' which has
a long pedigree is far more accurate and should be used.
Typology
It may help to specify
the types of killing which are of particular concern in the
Philippines: Killings by military and police, and by the NPA or other
groups, in course of counter-insurgency. To the extent that such
killings take place in conformity with the rules of international
humanitarian law they fall outside my mandate. Killings not in the
course of any armed engagement but in pursuit of a specific
counter-insurgency operation in the field. Killings, whether
attributed to the military, the police, or private actors, of
activists associated with leftist groups and usually deemed or assumed
to be covertly assisting CPP-NPA-NDF. Private actors include hired
thugs in the pay of politicians, landowners, corporate interests, and
others. Vigilante, or death squad, killings Killings of journalists
and other media persons. 'Ordinary' murders facilitated by the sense
of impunity that exists.
Response by the Government
The response of
Government to the crisis of extrajudicial executions varies
dramatically. There has been a welcome acknowledgement of the
seriousness of the problem at the very top. At the executive level the
messages have been very mixed and often unsatisfactory. And at the
operational level, the allegations have too often been met with a
response of incredulity, mixed with offence.
Explanations proffered
When I have sought
explanations of the killings I have received a range of answers.
(i) The allegations
are essentially propaganda. I have addressed this dimension already.
(ii) The allegations
are fabricated. Much importance was attached to two persons who had
been listed as killed, but who were presented to me alive. Two errors,
in circumstances which might partly explain the mistakes, do very
little to discredit the vast number of remaining allegations.
(iii) The theory that
the 'correct, accurate, and truthful' reason for the recent rise in
killings lies in purges committed by the CPP/NPA. This theory was
relentlessly pushed by the AFP and many of my Government
interlocutors. But we must distinguish the number of 1,227 cited by
the military from the limited number of cases in which the CPP/NPA
have acknowledged, indeed boasted, of killings. While such cases have
certainly occurred, even those most concerned about them, such as
members of Akbayan, have suggested to me that they could not amount to
even 10% of the total killings. The evidence offered by the military
in support of this theory is especially unconvincing. Human rights
organizations have documented very few such cases. The AFP relies
instead on figures and trends relating to the purges of the late
1980s, and on an alleged CPP/NPA document captured in May 2006
describing Operation Bushfire. In the absence of much stronger
supporting evidence this particular document bears all the hallmarks
of a fabrication and cannot be taken as evidence of anything other
than disinformation.
(iv) Some killings may
have been attributable to the AFP, but they were committed by rogue
elements. There is little doubt that some such killings have been
committed. The AFP needs to give us precise details and to indicate
what investigations and prosecutions have been undertaken in response.
But, in any event, the rogue elephant theory does not explain or even
address the central questions with which we are concerned.
Some major challenges for the future
(a) Acknowledgement by
the AFP – The AFP remains in a state of almost total denial (as its
official response to the Melo Report amply demonstrates) of its need
to respond effectively and authentically to the significant number of
killings which have been convincingly attributed to them. The
President needs to persuade the military that its reputation and
effectiveness will be considerably enhanced, rather than undermined,
by acknowledging the facts and taking genuine steps to investigate.
When the Chief of the AFP contents himself with telephoning Maj-Gen
Palparan three times in order to satisfy himself that the persistent
and extensive allegations against the General were entirely unfounded,
rather than launching a thorough internal investigation, it is clear
that there is still a very long way to go.
(b) Moving beyond the
Melo Commission – It is not for me to evaluate the Melo Report. That
is for the people of the Philippines to do. The President showed good
faith in responding to allegations by setting up an independent
commission. But the political and other capital that should have
followed is being slowly but surely drained away by the refusal to
publish the report. The justifications given are unconvincing. The
report was never intended to be preliminary or interim. The need to
get 'leftists' to testify is no reason to withhold a report which in
some ways at least vindicates their claims. And extending a Commission
whose composition has never succeeded in winning full cooperation
seems unlikely to cure the problems still perceived by those groups.
Immediate release of the report is an essential first step.
(c) The need to
restore accountability – The focus on TF Usig and Melo is
insufficient. The enduring and much larger challenge is to restore
the various accountability mechanisms that the Philippines
Constitution and Congress have put in place over the years, too many
of which have been systematically drained of their force in recent
years. I will go into detail in my final report, but suffice it to
note for present purposes that Executive Order 464, and its
replacement, Memorandum Circular 108, undermine significantly the
capacity of Congress to hold the executive to account in any
meaningful way.
(d) Witness protection
– The vital flaw which undermines the utility of much of the judicial
system is the problem of virtual impunity that prevails. This, in
turn, is built upon the rampant problem of witness vulnerability. The
present message is that if you want to preserve your life expectancy,
don't act as a witness in a criminal prosecution for killing.
Witnesses are systematically intimidated and harassed. In a relatively
poor society, in which there is heavy dependence on community and very
limited real geographical mobility, witnesses are uniquely vulnerable
when the forces accused of killings are all too often those, or are
linked to those, who are charged with ensuring their security. The WPP
is impressive – on paper. In practice, however, it is deeply flawed
and would seem only to be truly effective in a very limited number of
cases. The result, as one expert suggested to me, is that 8 out of 10
strong cases, or 80% fail to move from the initial investigation to
the actual prosecution stage.
(e) Acceptance of the
need to provide legitimate political space for leftist groups – At the
national level, there has been a definitive abandonment of President
Ramos' strategy of reconciliation. This might be termed the Sinn Fein
strategy. It involves the creation of an opening the party-list system
for leftist groups to enter the democratic political system, while at
the same time acknowledging that some of those groups remain very
sympathetic to the armed struggle being waged by illegal groups (the
IRA in the Irish case, or the NPA in the Philippines case). The goal
is to provide an incentive for such groups to enter mainstream
politics and to see that path as their best option.
Neither the party-list
system nor the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Act has been reversed by
Congress. But, the executive branch, openly and enthusiastically
aided by the military, has worked resolutely to circumvent the spirit
of these legislative decisions by trying to impede the work of the
party-list groups and to put in question their right to operate
freely. The idea is not to destroy the NPA but to eliminate
organizations that support many of its goals and do not actively
disown its means. While non-violent in conception, there are cases in
which it has, certainly at the local level, spilled over into
decisions to extrajudicially execute those who cannot be reached by
legal process.
(f) Re-evaluate
problematic aspects of counter-insurgency strategy – The increase in
extrajudicial executions in recent years is attributable, at least in
part, to a shift in counterinsurgency strategy that occurred in some
areas, reflecting the considerable regional variation in the
strategies employed, especially with respect to the civilian
population. In some areas, an appeal to hearts-and-minds is combined
with an attempt to vilify left-leaning organizations and to intimidate
leaders of such organizations. In some instances, such intimidation
escalates into extrajudicial execution. This is a grave and serious
problem and one which I intend to examine in detail in my final
report.
Conclusion
The Philippines
remains an example to all of us in terms of the peaceful ending of
martial law by the People's Revolution, and the adoption of a
Constitution reflecting a powerful commitment to ensure respect for
human rights. The various measures ordered by the President in
response to Melo constitute important first steps, but there is a huge
amount that remains to be done.